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I. INTRODUCTION
[1]
Technological innovations permeate almost every inch of society.
From the government and corporate workforce to family and social
settings, technology seemingly knows no boundaries. Technology’s
limitless reach has even crossed into the realm of public schools, where,
according to teacher Lyn Newton, “[s]chool principals are witnessing
more and more cell phone use by their teachers.”1 Teachers, like other
cell phone users, use cell phones not only for making phone calls, but also
for taking pictures and texting,2 which has landed some teachers in trouble

*Joseph O. Oluwole, J.D., Ph.D., is an attorney-at-law and a professor of Education Law
at Montclair State University. I would like to thank my graduate assistant Megan Raquet
for her highly commendable assistance with this article. I am thankful to the editors and
reviewers of the Richmond Journal of Law and Technology for their sedulous help with
this article.
1

Lyn Newton, Teacher Cell Phone Use at School, FAMILIES.COM, http://education.
families.com/blog/teacher-cell-phone-use-at-school (last visited Jan. 6, 2010).
2

See, e.g., Andra Varin, Sex Crime, Not Seduction: More Female Teachers Prosecuted
for Having Sex With Students, AOLNEWS (Aug. 21, 2009), http://www.aolnews.com/story/
female-teachers-charged-with-sex-abuse/634372.
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Indeed, the sexting wave has not

[2]
The problems with cell phone technology become more
pronounced when school-issued phones are used, particularly because
school administrators may claim the right to seize and search said phones.5
Yet, a vacuum in the adjudication of the search and seizure of teacher cell
phones has left uncertainty concerning the legal parameters of the
regulation of school-owned cell phones. Furthermore, there is a clear lack
of literature examining the constitutionality of searching public school
teachers’ cell phones. This Article attempts to fill the literary void
through examination of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2010 City of Ontario v.
Quon6 decision regarding the search and seizure of employer-provided
devices.
[3]
Part II of this Article presents the facts of Quon. Part III then
discusses the Supreme Court’s decision with Parts IV and V examining
Justice Stevens’ concurring opinion and Justice Scalia’s concurring
opinion, respectively. With the Quon decision firmly outlined, Part VI
undertakes an examination of the status of teacher cell phones in public
school districts. Finally, Parts VII and VIII conclude with the implications
of the Quon decision for the search and seizure of employer-provided
teacher cell phones.
II. THE FACTS IN ONTARIO V. QUON
[4]
Quon began after the Ontario Police Department (OPD),
California, audited the text messages of police sergeant, and SWAT team
3

See e.g., Varin, supra note 2.

4

See id.

5

See e.g., B.C. Manion, School Trying Cell Phones as Teacher’s Aid, TAMPA TRIB., Oct.
22, 1996, at University/New Tampa 1. For this article’s purposes, cell phones and pagers
are synonymous, as was the case in the United States Supreme Court decision City of
Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2630 (2010).
6

130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010).
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member, Jeff Quon.7 The text messages were retrieved from one of the
twenty OPD provided pagers given to OPD officers to help further the
SWAT team’s work and facilitate responses to emergencies.8 OPD’s
contract with Arch Wireless Operating Company, the wireless-service
provider, limited the number of characters the pagers could send or receive
monthly before incurring overage charges.9 Quon eclipsed the monthly
character limit.10
[5]
While the OPD did not have a written policy specifically
regulating employee use of cell phones or pagers, it had a general
“Computer Usage, Internet and E-Mail Policy” (Computer Policy).11 This
Computer Policy stated inter alia: “[the employer] reserves the right to
monitor and log all network activity including e-mail and Internet use,
with or without notice. Users should have no expectation of privacy or
confidentiality when using these resources.”12 Additionally, the OPD
informed employees verbally and in a memorandum that text messages
and e-mails would be treated similarly and subject to audit.13 In fact, the
officers were told that text messages “‘are considered e-mail messages.’”14
[6]
Quon signed the Computer Policy, confirming that he had read and
understood it.15 Quon was further reminded of this policy after he went
over the character limit for his pager.16 But, at the same time he was told
7

See id. at 2624.

8

See id. at 2625.

9

See id.

10

See id.

11

See Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2625.

12

Id.

13

See id.

14

Id. (citation omitted).

15

See id.

16

See Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2625.
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that there was no “‘intent to audit [an] employee’s text messages to see if
the overage [was] due to work related transmissions.’”17 Ultimately, Quon
was offered and accepted the opportunity to pay for his overages in lieu of
an audit of his text messages.18
[7]
Because Quon and at least one other officer repeatedly went over
their allotted character limit, the OPD chief launched an investigation to
determine if the character allotment for text messages was insufficient.19
Integral to its investigation, the OPD sought to determine if the overages
were work-related or personal; such a determination was to ensure that
employees were not paying out of pocket for work-related overages.20 As
part of the inspection, the OPD examined the transcript of Quon’s text
messages.21 The transcript revealed that not only were many of the text
messages personal, but some were actually sexually explicit.22 This
discovery prompted further internal investigations, which concluded that
Quon violated OPD rules because he attended to personal affairs while on
duty.23
[8]
Quon, along with several individuals who had sent him text
messages, filed suit against the OPD and its officials claiming a violation
of the Fourth Amendment’s Search and Seizure Clause.24 On a summary

17

Id. (alterations in original) (citation omitted).

18

See id. (noting that other employees who incurred overages were offered the same
opportunity).
19

See id. at 2625-26.

20

See id. at 2626.

21

See id. Arch Wireless provided the transcript, which were redacted to protect Quon’s
off-duty text messages from review. Id.
22

See Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2626.

23

See id.

24

See id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or

4
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judgment motion, the federal district court for the Central District of
California ruled for the OPD.25 Specifically, the district court held that
even though Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his text
messages, the search itself was reasonable.26 The court ruled that the
reasonableness of the search was contingent on the intent of the search,
and consequently, referred the case to a jury to determine the OPD’s
intent.27 The jury, ultimately, determined that the audit was intended to
determine the sufficiency of the character allotment to the OPD’s
employees.28 The court then reasoned that the search was constitutional in
this case because the intent of the search was to evaluate the adequacy of
the text character allotment, rather than to determine if Quon was abusing
his pager.29
[9]
Like the district court, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled
that Quon had a reasonable privacy expectation in his text messages.30
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.”).
25

See Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 445 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1138, 1151 (C.D.
Cal. 2006) [hereinafter Arch Wireless I].
26

See id. at 1143-46.

27

See id. at 1146; see also Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 899 (9th
Cir. 2008) [hereinafter Arch Wireless II].
28

See Arch Wireless II, 529 F.3d at 899; see also Arch Wireless I, 445 F. Supp. 2d at
1146.
29

See Arch Wireless I, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 1146 (“[T]he Court finds that if the purpose for
the audit was to determine if Quon was using his pager to ‘play games’ and ‘waste time,’
then the audit was not constitutionally reasonable, and performing the same violated the
Fourth Amendment rights of Quon and those to whom he communicated. On the other
hand, if the purpose for the audit was to determine the efficacy of the existing character
limits to ensure that officers were not paying hidden work-related costs, then the Court
finds that no constitutional violation occurred.”); see also id. at 1144 (“Insofar as the
audit was meant to ferret out misconduct by determining whether the officers in question
were ‘playing games’ with their pagers or otherwise ‘wasting a lot of City time
conversing with someone about non-related work issues,’ the Court finds the audit was
not justified at its inception.”).
30

See Arch Wireless II, 529 F.3d at 906.
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However, the Ninth Circuit found the search unconstitutional because it
was unreasonable in scope and there were other less intrusive ways to
determine the efficacy of the character allotment, including having Quon
himself redact the transcript.31 The Ninth Circuit ultimately denied a
petition for an en banc review,32 and the U. S. Supreme Court granted
certiorari.33
III. THE SUPREME COURT OPINION
[10] At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Fourth
Amendment prohibits a public employer from searching the text messages
employees send on employer-provided devices.34 The Court began its
evaluation by emphasizing that the Fourth Amendment governs
government action in its role as employer.35 The Court also observed that
the Amendment’s reach is not limited to criminal investigations.36 In fact,
at its core, the Amendment is designed to protect “‘the privacy, dignity,
and security of persons against certain arbitrary and invasive acts by
officers of the Government.’”37 To accentuate the fact that government

31

See id. at 909 (“There were a host of simple ways to verify the efficacy of the 25,000
character limit (if that, indeed, was the intended purpose) without intruding on [Quon’s]
Fourth Amendment rights. For example, the Department could have warned Quon that
for the month of September he was forbidden from using his pager for personal
communications, and that the contents of all of his messages would be reviewed to ensure
the pager was used only for work-related purposes during that time frame. Alternatively,
if the Department wanted to review past usage, it could have asked Quon to count the
characters himself, or asked him to redact personal messages and grant permission to the
Department to review the redacted transcript.”).
32

Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 554 F.3d 769, 769 (2009).

33

City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2627 (2010).

34

See id. at 2628-29.

35

See id. at 2627-28 (citing Treasury Emps. v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989)).

36

See id. at 2627 (citing Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 530 (1967)).

37

Id. (quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n., 489 U.S. 602, 613-14 (1989)).

6
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employers must comply with the Fourth Amendment, the Court relied on
its decision in O’Connor v. Ortega.38
[11] In O’Connor, officials at a state hospital searched the office of a
physician employed at the hospital as part of an investigation into alleged
work-related improprieties.39 In its review of the Fourth Amendment
challenge to the search, the Court rejected the notion that “public
employees can never have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their
place of work.”40 Instead, the Court ruled that “[i]ndividuals do not lose
Fourth Amendment rights merely because they work for the government
instead of a private employer.”41
[12] According to a plurality in O’Connor, “[t]he operational realities
of the workplace, however, may make some employees’ expectations of
privacy unreasonable when an intrusion is by a supervisor rather than a
law enforcement official.”42 In other words, contrary to Justice Scalia’s
assertion in his O’Connor concurrence,43 there is no blanket Fourth
38

Id. at 2628.

39

See O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 712-13 (1987).

40

Id. at 717.

41

Id.

42

Id.; see also id. (“Public employees’ expectations of privacy in their offices, desks, and
file cabinets, like similar expectations of employees in the private sector, may be reduced
by virtue of actual office practices and procedures, or by legitimate regulation.”).
43

See id. at 731 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“I cannot agree, moreover, with the plurality’s
view that the reasonableness of the expectation of privacy (and thus the existence of
Fourth Amendment protection) changes ‘when an intrusion is by a supervisor rather than
a law enforcement official.’ The identity of the searcher (police v. employer) is relevant
not to whether Fourth Amendment protections apply, but only to whether the search of a
protected area is reasonable. Pursuant to traditional analysis the former question must be
answered on a more ‘global’ basis. . . . I would hold, therefore, that the offices of
government employees, and a fortiori the drawers and files within those offices, are
covered by Fourth Amendment protections as a general matter.”) (citation omitted).
Justice Scalia would also apply a uniform standard to private and public employer
searches. See id. at 732 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“I would hold that government searches
to retrieve work-related materials or to investigate violations of workplace rules –

7
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Amendment protection for government employees’ offices.44 Instead, the
O’Connor plurality ruled that inquiry into the “operational realities of the
workplace” is a condition precedent to determining the existence of Fourth
Amendment rights in the workplace.45 Additionally, the Court declared
that the “operational realities of the workplace” create “special needs,
beyond the normal need for law enforcement,” which exempt employerconducted searches from the Amendment’s probable cause and warrant
requirements.46
[13] Approximately two years after O’Connor, the Supreme Court
nominally clarified the role of “operational realities” in the Fourth
Amendment analysis of workplace searches.47 Specifically, the Court
ruled that, rather than exclusively serving as a condition precedent to
existence of Fourth Amendment rights, “operational realities” could
“diminish privacy expectations” of public employees.48

searches of the sort that are regarded as reasonable and normal in the private-employer
context – do not violate the Fourth Amendment.”).
44

See id. at 717-18; see also City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2628 (2010)
(interpreting O’Connor’s plurality opinion as requiring a case-by-case decision as
opposed to Justice Scalia’s blanket view).
45

See O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 717; see also Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2628 (“[A] court must
consider [t]he operational realities of the workplace in order to determine whether an
employee's Fourth Amendment rights are implicated . . . .”) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
46

See O’Connor, 480 U.S.. at 725 (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351
(1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring)); see also Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2630.
47

See Treasury Emps. v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 671 (1989).

48

Id. at 671; see also id. (“Employees of the United States Mint, for example, should
expect to be subject to certain routine personal searches when they leave the workplace
every day. Similarly, those who join our military or intelligence services may not only be
required to give what in other contexts might be viewed as extraordinary assurances of
trustworthiness and probity, but also may expect intrusive inquiries into their physical
fitness for those special positions.”).

8
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[14] A majority of the O’Connor Court ruled that a standard of
reasonableness must govern workplaces searches.49 The Justices reasoned
that “[a] standard of reasonableness will neither unduly burden the efforts
of government employers to ensure the efficient and proper operation of
the workplace, nor authorize arbitrary intrusions upon the privacy of
public employees.”50 This reasonableness standard for “public employer
intrusions on the constitutionally protected privacy interests of
government employees for noninvestigatory, work-related purposes, as
well as for investigations of work-related misconduct”51 demands that
searches must be reasonable at inception and in scope.52 Namely, under
this two-step reasonableness standard, courts must first determine if the
search was justified at its inception, and then determine if “the search as
actually conducted was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances
which justified the interference in the first place.”53
[15] The Quon Court chose not to establish or endorse a “threshold test
for determining the scope of an employee’s Fourth Amendment rights.”54
More specifically, the Court decided not to choose between the O’Connor
plurality’s position, which argued there should be no blanket Fourth
Amendment protection for workplace searches,55 and that of Justice
Scalia, who argued there should be a uniform standard for searches by
public and private employers.56 The Court’s rationale was that Quon was
49

See O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 725.

50

Id.; see also id. at 726 (“Under this reasonableness standard, both the inception and the
scope of the intrusion must be reasonable . . . .”).
51

Id. at 725.

52

See id. at 726.

53

New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)); see also O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 726.
54

City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2628 (2010).

55

See O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 717-18 (1987).

56

See Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2634 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).

9
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not the case for such a choice since both approaches lead to the same
conclusion: the search was reasonable.57
[16] The Court was also hesitant to use Quon as a test case for further
development of O’Connor due to the dynamic nature of technology, the
highly undeveloped state of the laws governing the interaction of
technology and privacy, and the unpredictability of societal norms about
proper technological etiquette.58
The Court instead chose to
foundationally assume that the review of Quon’s text messages constituted
a Fourth Amendment search; and that Quon had a reasonable expectation
of privacy in the text messages.59 The Court acknowledged, however, the
parties’ disagreement over whether Quon even had a reasonable
expectation of privacy.60 The petitioners contended that Quon had no
reasonable privacy expectation because the OPD informed its employees
that text messages were governed by the computer policy and that text
messages were not deemed private.61 The respondents countered, arguing
that an OPD official’s verbal statement to Quon—that his text messages
would not be audited if he paid his overages—countermanded the official
57

See id. at 2628-29.

58

See id. at 2629-30. For instance, the Court pointed out that “[r]apid changes in the
dynamics of communication and information transmission are evident not just in the
technology itself but in what society accepts as proper behavior. . . . At present, it is
uncertain how workplace norms, and the law's treatment of them, will evolve.” Id. at
2630 (emphasis added).
59

See id. at 2630. The Court also assumed that the same Fourth Amendment limitations
that apply to the search of physical space also apply to the search of electronics. Here are
the three main assumptions of the Court overarching its review, in the Court’s own
words: “For present purposes we assume several propositions arguendo: First, Quon had
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the text messages sent on the pager provided to
him by the City; second, petitioners' review of the transcript constituted a search within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment; and third, the principles applicable to a
government employer’s search of an employee's physical office apply with at least the
same force when the employer intrudes on the employee’s privacy in the electronic
sphere.” Id.
60

See id. at 2629.

61

See id.
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policy; consequently, respondents reasoned, Quon had a reasonable
expectation of privacy.62
[17] In detailed dicta, the Court revealed that if it were to determine the
legitimacy of Quon’s expectation of privacy pursuant to O’Connor, it
would need to conduct an “operational realities” inquiry.63 This inquiry
would have to include the following determinations: (1) whether the
verbal statements of the OPD official constituted a change in official
policy; (2) if the first question is answered in the affirmative, then it must
be determined whether the OPD official had actual authority or the color
of authority to: (i) institute the change; and (ii) “guarantee the privacy of
text messaging[;]”64 and (3) other reasons that would justify or excuse
auditing text messages sent on employer-provided pagers or cell phones
during work hours.65 Such justifications/excuses would include audits for
performance evaluations, audits pursuant to litigation about the legality of
government actions as well as audits necessary to comply with state open
records laws.66
[18] The Court appeared a little apprehensive in its review of the Fourth
Amendment implications of text messages on employer-provided
communication devices. This is evident in the Court’s use of such
cautionary phrases as “proceed with care”, “judiciary risks error” and
“[p]rudence counsels caution” in its opinion.67 For instance, the Court
62

See City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629 (2010).

63

Id.

64

Id.

65

See id.

66

See id.

67

Id. The Court acknowledged that, while it was able to rely on “its own knowledge and
experience” to find a reasonable privacy expectation in phone booths in Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
353 (1967), the same could not be said for pagers or cell phones. See Quon, 130 S. Ct. at
2629 (“In Katz, the Court relied on its own knowledge and experience to conclude that
there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in a telephone booth. It is not so clear that
courts at present are on so sure a ground.”) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
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noted that “[t]he judiciary risks error by elaborating too fully on the
Fourth Amendment implications of emerging technology before its role in
society has become clear.”68 Likewise, the Court observed that
[e]ven if the Court were certain that the O’Connor
plurality’s approach were the right one, the Court would
have difficulty predicting how employees’ privacy
expectations will be shaped by those changes [i.e.
workplace norms, technological changes and the law’s
evolution in response to increased technology use at work]
or the degree to which society will be prepared to recognize
those expectations as reasonable.69
Ironically, in the Court’s eagerness to avoid uncertainty, it might have
created more uncertainty in the law due to its failure to settle the law;
indeed, the Court itself acknowledged the current pendent state of the
law.70
[19] In light of the Court’s decision not to choose between the
O’Connor plurality’s approach and Justice Scalia’s approach, the Court
applied both approaches to show that they lead to the same conclusion.71
However, most of the Court’s reasonableness analysis was conducted
under the O’Connor plurality’s two-step reasonableness standard.72
68

Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2629 (emphasis added); see also id. at 2630 (“A broad holding
concerning employees’ privacy expectations vis-à-vis employer-provided technological
equipment might have implications for future cases that cannot be predicted.”).
69

Id. at 2630.

70

See id. at 2629-30. Justice Scalia agrees, as he aptly characterized this refusal to clarify
the law as “self-defeating.” Id. at 2635 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment).
71

See id. at 2630-33.

72

See id. at 2630. The two-part standard requires that: (i) the search was “justified at its
inception”; and (ii) “the search as actually conducted was reasonably related in scope to
the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” O’Connor v.
Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725-26 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing New
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985)).

12
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[20] Under the O’Connor analysis, the Court found that the OPD’s
procurement and review of the text messages were “justified at [their]
inception because there were reasonable grounds for suspecting that the
search [was] necessary for a noninvestigatory work-related purpose.”73
The Court reasoned that the intent of the audit of Quon’s messages –
evaluation of the adequacy of employees’ text character allotment74 –
constituted a “noninvestigatory work-related purpose.”75 In accordance
with this reasoning, the Court concluded that the petitioners “had a
legitimate interest in ensuring that employees were not being forced to pay
out of their own pockets for work-related expenses, or on the other hand
that the City [of Ontario] was not paying for extensive personal
communications.”76
[21] Under the second step of the O’Connor reasonableness standard,
the Court found the scope of the search reasonable.77 As justification, the
Court cited the efficiency and expediency of text message reviews to the
petitioners’ audit intent.78 Further, the Court found the scope of the search
reasonable because it was “not ‘excessively intrusively.’”79
This
conclusion was supported by the OPD’s deliberate efforts to redact text
messages that Quon sent while he was off-duty, as well as the OPD’s
decision to review texts for only two of the months that Quon incurred
overages.80 Additionally, the Court declared that there are varying degrees
73

Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2631 (quoting O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 726) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
74

See id.; Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 899 (9th Cir. 2008)
(discussing the jury determination of the audit’s intent).
75

City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2631 (2010).

76

Id.

77

See id.

78

See id.

79

Id. (quoting O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 726 (1987)).

80

See id. The Supreme Court acknowledged that the OPD might have reasonable
grounds to review text messages for all the months that Quon incurred overages. See id.
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of reasonable expectations of privacy, and the degree of expectation is
relevant to the intrusiveness and, consequently, scope of analysis.81 For
instance, the Court pointed out that Quon had a relatively low expectation
of privacy because he was informed in the official policy that his messages
could be audited.82 Therefore, the Court reasoned that Quon could not
have had such a high expectation of privacy as to justify a belief that he
had carte blanche immunity from an audit of his messages.83
[22] The Court also revealed that Quon’s role as a law enforcement
officer played a key role in diminishing his expectation of privacy: “As a
law enforcement officer, he would or should have known that his actions
were likely to come under legal scrutiny, and that this might entail an
analysis of his on-the-job communications.”84 In fact, the Court intimated
that, law enforcement officer or not, the expectation of privacy would
diminish for any employee if the employer provided the pager or cell
phone, and if the employee was informed that text messages are subject to
audit or the employee “received no assurances of privacy.”85 The Court
reasoned that, given these circumstances, “a reasonable employee would
be aware that sound management principles might require the audit of
messages to determine whether the pager was being appropriately used.”86
Accordingly, the Court concluded that Quon’s expectation of privacy was
“only a limited privacy expectation,” 87 though the Court declined to
81

See Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2631 (citing Treasury Emps. v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 671
(1989); cf. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654-57 (1995))
(“Furthermore, and again on the assumption that Quon had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the contents of his messages, the extent of an expectation is relevant to
assessing whether the search was too intrusive.”).
82

See id.

83

See id.

84

Id.

85

Id.

86

Id.

87

Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2631.
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further delineate or clarify the boundaries of the limitations.88
Nonetheless, the Court ruled that the limited nature of Quon’s privacy
expectation reduced the intrusiveness of the search.89
[23] Finally, in its reasonable in scope analysis, the Court rejected the
Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that, since there were less intrusive ways to
conduct the search, the search was unreasonable.90 Specifically, the Court
pointed out that “[t]his approach was inconsistent with controlling
precedents.”91 The Court observed that it had “repeatedly refused to
declare that only the ‘least intrusive’ search practicable can be reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment.”92 The Court reasoned that the “least
intrusive” approach would insurmountably impede “virtually all searchand-seizure powers.”93 Indeed, as the Court noted, under the “least
intrusive” approach, judicial imagination of alternatives to any employer
searches or seizures would be limitless.94 Applying these principles, the
88

See id.

89

See id. at 2631-32 (“From OPD’s perspective, the fact that Quon likely had only a
limited privacy expectation, with boundaries that we need not here explore, lessened the
risk that the review would intrude on highly private details of Quon’s life. OPD’s audit
of messages on Quon's employer-provided pager was not nearly as intrusive as a search
of his personal e-mail account or pager, or a wiretap on his home phone line, would have
been. That the search did reveal intimate details of Quon’s life does not make it
unreasonable, for under the circumstances a reasonable employer would not expect that
such a review would intrude on such matters. The search was permissible in its scope.”).
90

See id. at 2632.

91

Id.

92

Id. (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 663 (1995)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
93

Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2632 (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 557
n.12 (1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
94

Id. (quoting Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 663) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[J]udges
engaged in post hoc evaluations of government conduct can almost always imagine some
alternative means by which the objectives of the government might have been
accomplished.” Id. (quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 629 n.9
(1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Court ruled that the OPD did not have to use less intrusive means,
including having Quon redact his personal messages or asking him to
conduct the audit himself.95
[24] The Court also rejected respondent’s argument that statutory
prohibition of a search makes a search “per se unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment.”96 The Court concluded its reasonableness analysis
by pointing out that the search of Quon’s text messages would pass muster
under Justice Scalia’s O’Connor approach.97
[25] Under Justice Scalia’s approach, the Fourth Amendment would
apply generally to Quon’s text messages, and uniform standards would
apply to employer searches of private and public employees.98 The Court
stated that the search of the text messages would be reasonable in the
private sector since it was designed for legitimate work-related
investigations and not overly intrusive.99 Accordingly, the search of
95

See id. The Court also indicated, in rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s decision, that the
OPD did not have to forewarn “‘Quon that for the month of September he was forbidden
from using his pager for personal communications, and that the contents of all his
messages would be reviewed to ensure the pager was used only for work-related purposes
during that time frame.” Id. (quoting Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d
892, 909 (9th Cir. 2008)). The Court concluded that “[e]ven assuming there were ways
that OPD could have performed the search that would have been less intrusive, it does not
follow that the search as conducted was unreasonable.” Id. (emphasis added). In other
words, the presence of less intrusive means is not a determinative factor in analyzing the
reasonableness of a search. See id.
96

Id. (citing Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 168 (2008); California v. Greenwood, 486
U.S. 35, 43 (1988)).
97

See id. 2633. Recall, under Justice Scalia’s approach in O’Connor, “the offices of
government employees, and a fortiori the drawers and files within those offices, are
covered by Fourth Amendment protections as a general matter. . . . I would hold that
government searches to retrieve work-related materials or to investigate violations of
workplace rules – searches of the sort that are regarded as reasonable and normal in the
private-employer context – do not violate the Fourth Amendment.” O’Connor v. Ortega,
480 U.S. 709, 731-32 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring).
98

See Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2628 (citing O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 731-32 (Scalia, J.,
concurring)).
99

See id. at 2632-33.
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Quon’s text messages – designed for a legitimate work-related
investigation and not excessively intrusive – was reasonable under Justice
Scalia’s approach.100
[26] The respondents argued that the Search and Seizure Clause also
protected those who sent Quon text messages.101 A sine qua non of such
protection, however, is a determination that persons who knowingly send
text messages to employer-provided devices have a reasonable expectation
of privacy in the messages.102 The Court refused to rule on the
respondents’ argument because it was possible to dispose of the case
without examining this question.103 Besides, the respondents contended
that if the search of Quon was unreasonable, the search must necessarily
be “unreasonable as to his correspondents.”104 But, they failed to argue
the corollary position that if the search of Quon’s messages was
reasonable, the search of his correspondents’ messages must also
necessarily be reasonable.105 Consequently, the Court reasoned that this
wanting “litigating position,” as well as the Court’s finding that the search
of Quon’s messages was reasonable, “necessarily” precluded Quon’s
correspondents from prevailing.106 The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit
Court’s decision and remanded the case for further review.107

100

See id. at 2633.

101

See id.

102

See id.

103

See id.

104

Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2633.

105

See id.

106

Id. (“In light of this litigating position and the Court’s conclusion that the search was
reasonable as to Jeff Quon, it necessarily follows that these other respondents cannot
prevail.”) (emphasis added).
107

Id.
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IV. JUSTICE STEVENS’ CONCURRING OPINION
[27]
While Justice Stevens completely agreed with the Court’s
opinion, he wrote a concurring opinion to underscore the wisdom of the
Court’s refusal to choose between the O’Connor plurality’s approach and
that of Justice Scalia as the test for determining the reasonable privacy
expectations of employees.108 According to Justice Stevens, O’Connor
actually presents a third approach: an ad hoc determination of employees’
reasonable expectations of privacy based on the nature of the search.109
He observed that Justice Blackmun propounded this approach in his
dissenting opinion for four Justices in O’Connor.110 There, Justice
Blackmun declared, “the precise extent of an employee’s expectation of
privacy often turns on the nature of the search.”111 The rationale for this
ad hoc approach lies in the absence of “tidy distinctions” between private
and workplace activities in this day and age.112 Consequently, Justice
Stevens reasoned that the degree of privacy expectations should be
determined “in light of the specific facts of each particular search, rather
than by announcing a categorical standard.”113
108

See id. (Stevens, J., concurring).

109

See id. (Stevens, J., concurring).

110

See Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2633 (Stevens, J., concurring).

111

O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 738 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).

112

Id. (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 739 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting)); see also O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 739 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“[T]he
reality of work in modern time, whether done by public or private employees, reveals
why a public employee’s expectation of privacy in the workplace should be carefully
safeguarded and not lightly set aside. It is, unfortunately, all too true that the workplace
has become another home for most working Americans. Many employees spend the
better part of their days and much of their evenings at work. . . . Consequently, an
employee’s private life must intersect with the workplace, for example, when the
employee takes advantage of work or lunch breaks to make personal telephone calls, to
attend to personal business, or to receive personal visitors in the office. As a result, the
tidy distinctions (to which the plurality alludes) between the workplace and professional
affairs, on the one hand, and personal possessions and private activities, on the other, do
not exist in reality.”) (citations omitted).
113

Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2633 (Stevens, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (citing O’Connor,
480 U.S. at 741 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
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[28] Withal, Justice Stevens concluded that even under the third
approach, the search of Quon’s text messages was reasonable for the very
same reasons the Court relied on in reaching the same conclusion: Quon
had only a limited privacy expectation because the facts showed that he
should have known that his employer-provided device was subject to
audit.114
V. JUSTICE SCALIA’S CONCURRING OPINION
[29] Justice Scalia, a critical voice in the O’Connor decision, filed an
opinion concurring in part with the Quon Court’s opinion and concurring
wholly with the judgment.115 Justice Scalia’s rationale for his separate
opinion was his continued support for a uniform standard for searches
conducted by private employers and public employers.116 Specifically,
Justice Scalia stated, “the proper threshold inquiry should be not whether
the Fourth Amendment applies to messages on public employees’
employer-issued pagers, but whether it applies in general to such
messages on employer-issued pagers.”117
[30] While Justice Scalia reaffirmed his rejection of the O’Connor
plurality’s “operational realities” framework for analyzing public
114

See id. at 2633-34 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“For the reasons stated at page 13 of the
Court’s opinion, it is clear that respondent Jeff Quon, as a law enforcement officer who
served on a SWAT Team, should have understood that all of his work-related actions –
including all of his communications on his official pager – were likely to be subject to
public and legal scrutiny. He therefore had only a limited expectation of privacy in
relation to this particular audit of his pager messages. Whether one applies the reasoning
from Justice O'Connor’s opinion, [Justice Scalia’s] concurrence, or Justice Blackmun’s
dissent in O'Connor, the result is the same: The judgment of the Court of Appeals in this
case must be reversed.”).
115

See id. at 2634 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); see also
O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 729-32 (Scalia, J., concurring).
116

See Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2634 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (finding that the O’Connor plurality’s standard for determining the Fourth
Amendment’s application to public employees is “standardless and unsupported”).
117

Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (alterations in
original).
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employer searches,118 he agreed with the Quon Court’s refusal to use this
as the test case for choosing between his O’Connor approach and that of
the plurality.119 Like the Court, he reasoned that even if it were assumed
that Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy, the search was
reasonable and “[t]hat should end the matter.”120 But he chided the Court
for “inexplicably interrupt[ing] its analysis with . . . an excursus on the
complexity and consequences of answering, [an] admittedly irrelevant
threshold question,” in light of the Court’s acknowledgment that the case
could be disposed of without further clarifying O’Connor.121 He warned
the Court that its excessive discussion of the O’Connor plurality’s
approach would inspire a “heavy-handed” posture in the lower courts and
excite litigants to flood the courts with cases.122
[31] Justice Scalia also admonished the Court for foregoing the
opportunity to further illuminate the constitutional parameters of
workplace electronic communication.123 He criticized the Court for
118

Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).

119

See id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).

120

Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).

121

See id. at 2634-35 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
Questioning the Court’s decision, Justice Scalia asked wittingly, “To whom do we owe
an additional explanation for declining to decide an issue, once we have explained that it
makes no difference?” Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
122

See Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2635 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (“Litigants will do likewise, using the threshold question whether the Fourth
Amendment is even implicated as a basis for bombarding lower courts with arguments
about employer policies, how they were communicated, and whether they were
authorized, as well as the latest trends in employees’ use of electronic media.”).
123

See id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“The Court’s
inadvertent boosting of the O’Connor plurality’s standard is all the more ironic because,
in fleshing out its fears that applying the test to new technologies will be too hard, the
Court underscores the unworkability of that standard. Any rule that requires evaluating
whether a given gadget is a ‘necessary instrumen[t] for self-expression, even selfidentification,’ on top of assessing the degree to which ‘the law’s treatment of [workplace
norms has] evolve[d],’ is (to put it mildly) unlikely to yield objective answers.”) (citation
omitted).
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justifying its refusal with the rationale of the unpredictable nature of
technology:
Applying the Fourth Amendment to new technologies may
sometimes be difficult, but when it is necessary to decide a
case we have no choice. The Court’s implication . . . that
where electronic privacy is concerned we should decide
less than we otherwise would (that is, less than the
principle of law necessary to resolve the case and guide
private action) – or that we should hedge our bets by
concocting case-specific standards or issuing opaque
opinions – is in my view indefensible. The-times-they-area-changin’ is a feeble excuse for disregard of duty.124
Justice Scalia concluded his opinion by castigating the Court for its
eschewal, arguing that it would fuel further uncertainty in the lower
courts.125 He might be right, but certainly only time will tell.
VI. TEACHERS AND THE INCIDENCE OF CELL PHONES AT SCHOOL
A. Overview of the Posture of Teacher Cell Phones in Public Schools
[32] Recently, public schools have begun providing their teachers with
cell phones.126 For example, in partnership with GTE Mobilnet, Broward
Elementary School in Florida provided cell phones to its teachers as part
of a program designed to enhance the communication between students’
families and the school.127 With the increased availability of cell phones
in public schools, a growing debate has developed between teachers and
124

Quon, 130 S.Ct. at 2635 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment). See supra Part II (arguing that the Court might actually create more instability
and uncertainty in the law by failing to clarify the law).
125

See id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (finding that the
Court “underscores the unworkability of that standard” to yield objective answers).
126

See, e.g., Manion, supra note 5.

127

See id.
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administrators over the permissible scope of teachers’ cell phone use and
the power of schools to regulate their use.128 According to a Florida
principal, the expanded availability of cell phones to teachers is “one of
the last taboos in education.”129
[33] Some educators contend that public schools should permit teachers
to use cell phones during school hours as a matter of convenience.130 For
example, cell phones afford teachers the opportunity to return parent calls,
or follow up with ill students or those with disciplinary issues.131 Deirdre
Fernandes of the Virginian-Pilot aptly observed that “[w]hen it comes to
student discipline, the cell phone is emerging as the teacher’s most feared
- and effective - tool of choice. And it doesn’t even have to be turned
on.”132
[34] This practice, known as “dialing for discipline,” has received great
reviews from teachers who use it as a “stick.”133 Eighth grade teacher
Carolyn Smith has noticed “she need only hold the phone up, fingers
poised on the keypad, to subdue an unruly student.”134 The cell phone,
coupled with the horrifying words “Your mother wants to talk to you,”
helped instill discipline in her class.135 Smith described this discipline
approach as a “watershed.”136 Laurian Bascay, a 13-year old student at
128

See, e.g., Newton, supra note 1.

129

Manion, supra note 5 (quoting Beverly DeMott, Principal, Broward Elementary
School).
130

See, e.g., Newton, supra note 1.

131

See id.

132

Deirdre Fernandes, Local Teachers Use Cell Phones as Type of Discipline; They May
Call Parents When Problems Arise, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Aug. 28, 2003, at A1.
133

See id. Some teachers, however, prefer the old-fashioned form of discipline, which
involves a note from the teacher and a call from the principal to the parent. Cf. id.
134

Id.

135

Id.

136

Id.
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Western Branch Middle School in Chesapeake, Virginia, revealed the
“power of the cell phone” when she indicated that the immediate threat of
a call to her parents instantly inspired her to stop disrupting her class.137
[35] First grade teacher Linda Lynch pointed out another benefit of
providing teachers with cell phones by saying, “[i]f a child gets hurt on the
playground, help can be summoned instantly. You don’t have to worry
about running for help. You can call 911 right away.”138 Kindergarten
teacher LuAnn Apple used her cell phone to create an innovative program
called Senior Telephone Pals (STP), which incorporates cell phones into
her pedagogy.139 Under STP, students connect with senior citizens for
weekly five-minute phone conversations and picture sharing sessions to
learn language skills and life experiences from their elders.140 Further,
access to cell phones ensures that teachers can make important calls from
the classroom without leaving the students unattended.141
[36] But, some teachers use phones for personal calls such as hair and
doctor appointments.142 Consequently, various schools have opted to
police teacher cell phone use, restricting use to lunch or other breaks
during the school day.143 For example, South Jackson Elementary School
in Georgia restricts teacher use of cell phones to planning time or
breaks.144 Additionally, the school prohibits teachers from using cell
137

Id. “‘I stopped,’ the rising eighth-grader said. ‘Nobody likes to get their parents
called.’” Id. (quoting Laurian Bascay, Student, Western Branch Middle School).
138

Manion, supra note 5 (quoting Linda Lynch, First Grade Teacher, Broward
Elementary School) (internal quotation marks omitted).
139

Id.

140

See id.

141

See, e.g., Newton, supra note 1.

142

See, e.g., Manion, supra note 5; accord Newton, supra note 1.

143

See JACKSON CNTY. SCH. SYS., SOUTH JACKSON ELEMENTARY SCHOOL TEACHER
HANDBOOK 15 (2004), available at http://www.jackson.k12.ga.us/sjes/sjes_teacher_
handbook_fall_2004.pdf.
144

See id.
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phones when supervising or teaching students.145 Even in emergencies,
cell phone use is limited to office staff and administrative personnel.146
Largo High School in Florida admonishes teachers to keep personal calls
to a minimum.147 The faculty handbook for Wisconsin Dells (WD) High
School states in pertinent part: “Modeling the WD WAY is an essential
factor in creating an effective classroom environment. Therefore, teaching
staff should not use cell phones during instructional time.”148 But, not
everyone is thrilled about the regulation of teacher cell phones. During his
tenure as president of the Virginia Beach Education Association, Jeff
Cobb was apathetic about teacher cell phone regulation and expressed the
union’s opposition.149
[37] Despite the regulations, some teachers disregard school cell phone
policies and essentially model improper behavior for their students.150
Evaluating these improper role models, Carol Bengle Gilbert, an award
leading Associated Content education writer and legal commentator,
declared:
What distresses me about cell phone use in the classroom is
not what the children might do – the teachers are there to
supervise them and enforce the rules after all. No, it’s the
teachers who concern me. . . . It seems that teachers who
expect children to respect them by paying attention and not
145

Id.

146

See id. But cf. BOWIE INDEP. SCH. DIST., BOWIE ELEMENTARY SCHOOL FACULTY
HANDBOOK 2008-2009, at 15 (2008), available at http://es.bowieisd.net/pdf/Faculty_
handbook_08-09.pdf (allowing cell phone use in emergency situations).
147

See LARGO HIGH SCH., LARGO HIGH SCHOOL TEACHER HANDBOOK 1914-2011, at 19
(2010), available at http://www.largo-hs.pinellas.k12.fl.us/Staff/TeacherHandbook.pdf.
148

WIS. DELLS HIGH SCH., WIS. DELLS HIGH SCHOOL FACULTY HANDBOOK 2010-2011
(2010),
available
at
http://www.sdwd.k12.wi.us/highschool/2010-11_Faculty_
Handbook.pdf.
149

See Fernandes, supra note 132.

150

See, e.g., Newton, supra note 1.
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using cell phones in class do not feel the same compulsion
to model respectful behavior by spending their teaching
hours focused on the children rather than their cells.151
She reported that her children often came home with complaints about
teachers chatting during class time on cell phones.152 Indeed, students
often see a double standard when their cell phones are regulated, while the
teachers’ are not.153 For instance, a frustrated fifteen-year old Amy
Gomes declared: “If their cell phone rings, it interrupts the class. If the
rule isn’t the same for them, it’s not fair.”154 In retort, some schools
contend that because teachers are adults, their cell phones do not need to
be regulated.155
[38] There is likewise a taxpayer concern with unregulated teacher cell
phone use: “[a]re the taxpayers paying public school teachers to chat on
the phone or attend to personal business during class time?”156
Particularly in this period of economic distress, and with teachers’
widespread complaints about the inadequacy of time to effectively educate
students, calls for audits of work time cell phone use are not infrequent.157
[39] Teachers also have faced disciplinary action and even criminal
charges for texting students, providing a possible rationale for searches of
teachers’ cell phones. In Texas, a thirty-four-year old elementary school
151

Carol Bengle Gilbert, Cell Phones in Classrooms? It’s the Teachers Talking,
ASSOCIATED CONTENT (Aug. 4, 2009), http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/
2023232/cell_phones_in_classrooms_its_the_teachers.html?cat=4 (emphasis added).
152

See id.

153

See, e.g., Kimberly Atkins, Students Say Cell Phone Ban Doesn’t Ring True for
Teachers, BOS. HERALD, Oct. 28, 2005, at News 6.
154

Id. (quoting Amy Gomes, Student, Charlestown High School).

155

See id.

156

Gilbert, supra note 151.

157

See id.
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teacher sent a text message stating “U suck” to her ten-year old student,
who responded: “So do you.”158 The student’s stepparent discovered the
array of text messages on his son’s cell phone, mistakenly assuming that
they were merely chatter among fifth-graders.159 This event represents a
prime example of a teacher violating the bounds of appropriate teacherstudent conduct.160
According to Stop Educator Sexual Abuse,
Misconduct and Exploitation (SESAME), the explosion of teacher cell
phones and texting in schools presents challenges since it gives teachers
“24-hour access” to students.161 While, as SESAME points out, the
evidence trail preserved by cell phones in cases of misconduct is
remarkable, it is not surprising that this teacher claimed that someone used
her cell phone to text the student without her knowledge.162
B. Teachers and the Growing Incidence of Sexting
[40] With increasing use of cellular phones, sexting is a growing
concern across the country.163 This practice, involving the transmission of
graphic messages via cell phones, is particularly appalling when it entails
teacher-student communications.164 For example, a math teacher in New
158

Lindsay Kastner, What Happens When Teachers Text Students?, SAN ANTONIO
EXPRESS-NEWS, Nov. 19, 2009, at 1A.
159

See id. Following a period of administrative leave, the Texas teacher mentioned above
ultimately resigned. See id.
160

See id.

161

Id. (quoting Terri Miller, President, Stop Educator Sexual Abuse, Misconduct and
Exploitation).
162

See id.

163

See e.g., Amanda Lenhart, Teens and Sexting, How and Why Minor Teens Are Sending
Sexually Suggestive Nude or Nearly Nude Images Via Text Messaging, PEW RESEARCH
CENTER, 2-3 (2009), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/
2009/PIP_Teens_and_Sexting.pdf.
164

See, e.g., David F. Capeless, Sexting, BERKSHIRE DISTRICT ATTORNEY,
http://www.mass.gov/?pageID=berhomepage&L=1&L0=Home&sid=Dber
(follow
“Crime Awareness & Prevention” hyperlink; then follow “Parents & Youth” hyperlink;
then follow “Sexting” hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 9, 2010).
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Jersey lost his job in 2009 after two female students complained about his
unbecoming graphic text messages.165 In Mississippi that same year, an
assistant football coach was terminated and arrested for texting a sexual
image of himself to a female student.166 Additionally, a forty-one year old
teacher in New Hampshire, dubbed the “Sexting Teacher,” was charged
with a felony for transmitting nude pictures of herself via cell phone to a
fifteen-year old student.167 The teacher’s sexting was disclosed only after
the student showed the graphic texts to his friend out of utter
excitement.168
Similarly, a teacher in Florida was charged with
transmitting pornography with an electronic device and transmitting
harmful material to a minor, when she sent sexually explicit images of
herself to an eighth grader.169 This incident was reported as “just the latest
in a number of recent arrests involving sexting, the dissemination of
pornographic messages a la naked pictures via cellphones.”170
[41] In 2010, a thirty-six year old teacher in Indiana resigned after he
was exposed for sending several sexual text messages to various
cheerleaders.171 In one of his texts to a fourteen-year old cheerleader, the
165

See Kastner, supra note 158.

166

See id.

167

Roz Zurko, Sexting Teacher - Melinda Dennehy - From Londonderry New
Hampshire– Sexting Pictures, The Sexting Teacher – Melinda Dennehy – Out on Bail –
Order to Stay Away From Children Under 16, ASSOCIATED CONTENT (Mar. 7, 2010),
www.associatedcontent.com/article/2768590%20/sexting_teacher_melinda_dennehy_fro
m.html?cat=7.
168

See id.

169

See Saul Relative, Teacher Christy Lynn Martin Arrested, Caught Sexting 8th Grade
Student, Sexting Naked Pictures Arrests on the Rise, ASSOCIATED CONTENT (Mar. 9,
2009), http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/1547907/teacher_christy_lynn_martin_
arrested.html?cat=17.
170

Id.

171

See Andrew Greiner, Indiana Teacher Accused of Sexting 8th Grade Cheerleaders,
“How About U Tell Me the ‘Bad’ Stuff U Do?”, NBC CHI. (Mar. 5, 2010, 8:45 AM),
http://www.nbcchicago.com/news/local-beat/Indiana-Teacher-Accused-of-Sexting-8thGrade-Cheerleaders-86587952.html.
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teacher wrote, “Something tells me ur not the goody good yur mom thinks
ur. I can be tempted to play Ru tempting?”172 Consequently, the student
was granted a protective order against the teacher and the police were
called in to investigate.173 Furthermore, a teacher had to register as a sex
offender with the state of Tennessee, after pleading guilty to four sexual
offense counts stemming from sexting female students.174 One of the
students indicated that the teacher sought to “see more skin” after she
texted him her photograph.175 The school district suspended the thirtyseven year old teacher and as a result, he is no longer permitted to teach
kindergarten through high school.176
[42] Recently, a twenty-nine year old teacher in New York was indicted
for sending inappropriate texts to a student, including a text reading,
“Naked photos please.”177 Similarly, a teacher in Washington resigned
after she was accused of texting her student inappropriately.178 Moreover,
another teacher was arrested and charged in Washington that same year
for “communicating with a minor for immoral purposes.”179 During a
2010 judicial proceeding in North Carolina, a thirty-eight year old teacher
172

Id. While the texting began innocently, the texts became inappropriate once the
teacher asked the girl, “’Why don’t u think ur hot?’ . . . . ‘Well ur way sexy for a lil girl’ .
. . . ‘How about u tell me the ‘bad’ stuff u do?’” Id.
173

See id.

174

See Assoc. Press, Tennessee Teacher Admits ‘Sexting’ Two Teenage Students,
FOXNEWS.COM (Feb. 26, 2009), http://www.foxnews.com/printer_friendly_story/
0,3566,501029,00.html.
175

Id.

176

See id.

177

See Assoc. Press, New York Teacher Accused of Soliciting Text Sex From Female
Student, FOX NEWS.COM
(Jan. 30, 2009), http://www.foxnews.com/story/
0,2933,486024,00.html.
178

See Kastner, supra note 158.

179

Teacher Accused of Sexting Student, Police Arrest Substitute Castle Rock Teacher,
KPTV.COM (May 16, 2009, 1:41 PM), http://www.kptv.com/news/19481429/detail.html.
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admitted to texting an image of his intimate body parts to a thirteen-year
old student.180 This teacher was sentenced to probation and received a
suspended sentence, where he was required to undergo a mental health
evaluation.181
[43] Furthermore, in 2009 a fifty-year teacher in New Jersey was
“charged with endangering the welfare of a child after allegedly sending
sexually explicit texts, emails and images to a 15-year-old student.”182
During that same year, a teacher in Pennsylvania was charged with
transmitting “sexual messages and a picture of a woman exposing her
breasts to the 16-year old boy’s cell phone.”183
[44] As these sexting incidents continue to increase, school districts will
likely move toward permitting searches of teachers’ cell phones,
particularly in light of the Quon decision.184
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See Ann Doss Helms, Former Teacher Admits Sexting Middle Schooler, Mother of 13Year-Old Found Explicit Photo on Girl’s Phone. Man Gets Suspended Sentence.,
CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Apr. 8, 2010, available at http://www.charlotteobserver.com/
2010/04/08/1363303/former-teacher-admits-sexting.html.
181

See id.
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Loren Fisher, Bridgewater-Raritan High School Teacher Charged with ‘Sexting’ Teen
Student, FLEMINGTON INJERSEY (Oct. 25, 2009, 3:32 PM), http://flemington.injersey.com
/2009/10/25/bridgewater-raritan-high-school-teacher-charged-with-sexting-teen-student/.
183

Justin Vellucci, Butler Senior High School Teacher Accused of ‘Sexting’ Student,
PITT. TRIB. REV., May 19, 2009, available at http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/
pittsburghtrib/news/regional/s_625734.html.
184

For more accounts, see School Employees Arrested for Sexual Crimes,
TEACHERCRIME.COM, http://www.teachercrime.com/ (last visited Nov. 21, 2010). While
it is unclear whether all of the examples above involved employer-provided cell phones,
all of them could play out with employer-provided cell phones. See, e.g., id.
Consequently, it is important to know what the implications of the Supreme Court’s
decision are for searching employer-provided devices, since an increasing number of
schools provide such devices to their employees.
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VII. IMPLICATIONS
[45] The Quon case highlights several important principles related to
employer-conducted workplace searches. One of these is the continuing,
foundational principle that employers do not need probable cause or a
warrant before searching employer-provided cell phones.185 Beyond this
foundational principle, employers will be well advised to comply with
both the principles the Court highlighted in the O’Connor plurality, and in
Justice Scalia’s concurrence.186
[46] Following the Court’s reasoning in Quon, it is safe to assume that
teachers have a reasonable expectation of privacy at work.187 As a
consequence of this assumption, and under the O’Connor plurality
approach, school districts seeking to conduct work-related investigatory
searches or searches for non-investigatory ends, must satisfy the two-step
standard: (i) the search must be justified at its inception; and (ii) the
conducted search must be reasonable in scope to the objectives of the
justified search without being excessively intrusive.188
[47] School districts must be aware of the fact that courts will examine
the intent of the cell phone audit in order to determine if the first step is
satisfied.189 If the intent of the search is a legitimate work-related intent,
the school district is likely to pass muster under the first step.190 In Quon
for example, the Court found the search of the text messages justified at
inception because it was intended to ensure that employees were not
paying for work-related text messages or that the employer was not paying
185

See City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2628, 2630 (2010).
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See supra Part III. This is critical because, as emphasized above, the Court chose not
to determine whether the plurality opinion or Justice Scalia’s approach should control in
this matter. See supra Part III.
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See Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2630.
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See id.
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See id. at 2631.
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See id.
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for personal text messages – “a legitimate work-related rationale.”191 If
schools similarly have such work-related rationale or if the search is
“necessary for a noninvestigatory work-related purpose,” the search would
likely satisfy the first step.192 Other rationales include audits pursuant to
performance evaluations, audits necessary for litigation about the legality
of government actions and possibly even audits designed to comply with
state open records laws.193
[48] For school districts to satisfy the second step, they need to show
that the cell phone audit is reasonably related to the intent of the search.194
In Quon, the court found the cell phone audit to be an “expedient” and
“efficient” means toward the intent of the search.195 There is nothing in
the Court’s opinion to suggest that school district cell phone audits would
not be upheld if districts choose to examine transcripts and records of text
messages for a similar end as in Quon.196 To strengthen its litigation
position in Fourth Amendment challenges to cell phone audits, it would be
prudent for districts to prepare and preserve clear documentation showing
that each cell phone audit conducted is an “expedient” and “efficient”
means to the ends of the search.197
[49] Additionally, under the second step, in order to pass muster,
searches must not be “‘excessively intrusive.’”198 According to the Court,
the search in Quon was not “‘excessively intrusive’” because the OPD
only reviewed two months of text messages as opposed to all months in
191

Id. (quoting Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 908 (9th Cir. 2008)).
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which Quon incurred overages.199 The search was also not excessively
intrusive because the OPD redacted text messages Quon sent while he was
off duty.200 Similarly, in reviewing transcripts of text messages, school
districts would be wise to redact messages sent by teachers while off duty
or to build in other controls to protect such messages from the audit.
[50] An employer can diminish the intrusiveness of a search by clearly
forewarning employees that employer-provided cell phones are subject to
audit.201 Such warnings would serve to reduce employees’ expectations of
privacy for, as the Court stated, “the extent of an expectation is relevant to
assessing whether the search was too intrusive.”202
[51] School districts also should implement a clear policy on teacher
cell phone searches and have employees sign a statement acknowledging
receipt and understanding of the policy; this would further ensure a
diminution of teachers’ privacy expectations.203 To maintain the validity
of such a policy, the school district should train school administrators on
how to implement the district policy and clearly inform them not to
circumvent the official policy. Additionally, the school district should tell
administrators not to grant ad hoc exceptions to the audit requirements in

199

Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2631 (quoting O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 726). However, the Court
noted that the OPD might have had reasonable grounds to search text messages for all
months in which Quon incurred overages. Id. In other words, the court will not likely
deem a school district cell phone audit of all months pertinent to the audit to be
excessively intrusive as long as the district has reasonable grounds. See id. In all, school
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pertinent to the audit. Id.
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cf. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654-57 (1995) (explaining that
student athletes have a lower privacy expectation because of the required changing in
public locker rooms and preseason physical examinations)).
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the policy, similar to the one that ostensibly occurred with the OPD
supervisor’s statement to Quon.204
[52] Further, the very fact that the cell phone is an employer-provided
device also diminishes the privacy expectation of teachers.205 The Court
declared that searches of “employer-provided” cell phones are “not nearly
as intrusive as a search” of personal cell phones or e-mail accounts, or
wiretapping of home phones.206 School districts should recognize that a
court does not render a search excessively intrusive simply because it
reveals “intimate details” of the teacher’s personal life, particularly where
the district has made reasonable efforts to avoid intrusion on such
details.207 School districts could also take solace in the fact that they are
not required to resort to the least-restrictive means when seeking to audit
teacher cell phones.208 Indeed, as noted earlier, the Court rejected the
Ninth Circuit’s requirement of a “least-restrictive means” approach.209
[53] Under Justice Scalia’s O’Connor approach, which was reiterated in
Quon, the Fourth Amendment would apply as a general matter to searches
of public school teachers.210
Moreover, the same standard of
reasonableness would apply to private employer and public employer
204

See id. at 2625 (“Duke [the OPD supervisor] said, however, that it was not his intent
to audit [an] employee’s text messages to see if the overage [was] due to work related
transmissions. Duke suggested that Quon could reimburse the City for the overage fee
rather than have Duke audit the messages. Quon wrote a check to the City for the
overage. Duke offered the same arrangement to other employees who incurred overage
fees.”) (internal citations omitted) (internal quotations omitted) (second and third
alteration in original).
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searches.211 If school districts can show, as the OPD did in Quon, that the
search has a legitimate work-related intent and is not excessively intrusive,
it would pass muster under Justice Scalia’s approach.212
VIII. CONCLUSION
[54] As highlighted earlier, even after Quon, uncertainty remains in the
workplace-cell phone-search jurisprudence as the Court itself readily
acknowledged.213 Consequently, going forward, schools must proceed
cautiously pursuant to both the Scalia and O’Connor plurality approaches
discussed above to minimize their legal exposure. As teacher sexting, as
well as public employee sexting, continues to increase on employerprovided devices, it is uncertain how the lower courts will interpret and
apply the Quon decision and the Supreme Court might be forced to revisit
the issue in the future and to make a choice between the plurality and
Justice Scalia’s O’Connor approaches. As Justice Scalia aptly observed:
Despite the Court’s insistence that it is agnostic about the
proper test, lower courts will likely read the Court’s selfdescribed “instructive” expatiation on how the O’Connor
plurality’s approach would apply here (if it applied), as a
heavy-handed hint about how they should proceed.
Litigants will do likewise, using the threshold question
whether the Fourth Amendment is even implicated as a
basis for bombarding lower courts with arguments about
employer policies, how they were communicated, and
whether they were authorized, as well as the latest trends in
employees’ use of electronic media. In short, in saying why
it is not saying more, the Court says much more than it
should.214
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